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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Osterhoudt appeals from his Judgment of Conviction Upon a Guilty Verdict to
Four Felony Counts, and Order of Commitment. He asserts that the district court erred
by allowing the alleged victim, H.O., to that Mr. Osterhoudt provided her with
methamphetamine, and further erred by allowing H.O. to testify that Mr. Osterhoudt
committed the act of oral to genital contact upon her when she was age five.
Additionally, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the district court erred by allowing the State to
present the recordings of conversations between he and his niece and between he and
his mother, as substantive evidence.

Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that even if the State

attempted to demonstrate that each of these three preserved errors is individually
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the accumulation of these errors deprived him of
a fair trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's misguided attempt to change
one of Mr. Osterhoudt's preserved claims - that the district court erred in admitting
hearsay statements as substantive evidence - into a claim of unpreserved error, and to
address the State's forfeiture of any argument that the preserved errors in the present
case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Osterhoudt's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in
detail, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to present evidence, pursuant to
IRE 404(b), that Mr. Osterhoudt provided methamphetamine to H.O., as such
evidence was not relevant to any charged count?

2.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to present evidence, in rebuttal and
pursuant to IRE 404(b), that Mr. Osterhoudt molested H.O. when she was five
years old, as such evidence did not rebut any arguments or claims made by the
defense?

3.

Did the district court err by allowing recordings of phone conversations between
Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, and Mr. Osterhoudt and his mother, as substantive
evidence for the truth of the matter asserted?

4.

Even if individually harmless, did the accumulation of preserved errors in this
case deprive Mr. Osterhoudt of a fair trial, requiring this Court to vacate his
convictions?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence, Pursuant To IRE
404(8), That Mr. Osterhoudt Provided Methamphetamine To H.O., As Such Evidence
Was Not Relevant To Any Charged Count
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present evidence
that Mr. Osterhoudt was "grooming" H.O. by providing her methamphetamine, beginning
when she was 14 years old. The court ruled that such evidence was admissible only as
it related to Count I, which alleged an act of lewd conduct committed on or between
November 1, 2006, and November 30, 2006. As H.O. herself testified, she had stopped
using methamphetamine by October of 2006.

Therefore, because Mr. Osterhoudt's

alleged providing meth to H.O. is not tied to any charged crime, such evidence was not
relevant. As such, the district court erred in finding that the evidence was relevant and
abused its discretion by admitting this evidence. Mr. Osterhoudt further asserts that the
State will not be able to prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. His
arguments on this issue are found in the Appellant's Brief and are not repeated herein.
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.19-27.)
The State's argument in response to this claim is simply that the district court did
not err in its ruling, and is generally unremarkable. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.)
However, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree with
Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(See generally, Respondent's Brief.) As

such, should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the State to present
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt provided H.O. with methamphetamine, this Court must
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vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,

227 (2010)

(holding that where alleged

error is followed

by a

contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State
bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based
upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see a/so State v. Almaraz, 2013 Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1,
2013) (petition for rehearing pending).

11.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Evidence, In Rebuttal And
Pursuant To IRE 404(b), That Ms. Osterhoudt Molested H.O. When She Was Five
Years Old, As Such Evidence Did Not Rebut Any Arguments Or Claims Made By The
Defense
Over the objection of defense counsel, the district court allowed H.O. to testify
that she first claimed that Mr. Osterhoudt had sexually abused her when she was five
years old, purportedly in rebuttal to the claim that she accused Mr. Osterhoudt so that
she could be with her boyfriend, Mr. Pederson. However, this evidence did not actually
rebut any evidence presented by the defense, and was pure propensity evidence. As
such, the district court erred in finding that the evidence was relevant and abused its
discretion by admitting this evidence. Mr. Osterhoudt further asserts that the State will
be unable to prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

His

arguments on this issue are found in the Appellant's Brief and are not repeated herein.
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.27-33.)
The State's argument in response to this claim is simply that the district court did
not err in its ruling, and is generally unremarkable. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.)
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However, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree with
Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.) As
such, should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the State to present
evidence that Mr. Osterhoudt molested H.O. when she was five years old, this Court
must vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court. See State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is followed by a
contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State
bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based
upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013 Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1,
2013) (petition for rehearing pending).

111.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Recordings Of Phone Conversations Between
Mr. Osterhoudt And His Niece, And Mr. Osterhoudt And His Mother, As Substantive
Evidence For The Truth Of The Matter Asserted
Over defense objection, the district court allowed the State to present audio
recordings of phone conversations that Mr. Osterhoudt had with his niece and his
mother, as substantive evidence.

Assuming the evidence was admissible as either

impeachment evidence or evidence of bias on the part of either S.M. or Sharon
Williams, the proffered evidence was still hearsay and should not have been admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted. By allowing the jury to consider these recordings as
substantive evidence, rather than merely impeaching, the district court abused its
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discretion. Furthermore, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that the State will be unable to prove
the error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In response, the State declines to address the actual issue raised by
Mr. Osterhoudt and instead asserts that Mr. Osterhoudt is at fault because he failed to
ask the court to instruct the jury that they could not consider the evidence for the truth of
the matter asserted, thereby purportedly shifting the burden to Mr. Osterhoudt to
demonstrate the error requires reversal under a Perry fundamental error analysis. 1
(See Respondent's Brief pp.15-17.)

Notably, the State does not actually argue or

attempt to support with citations to the record that the district court ruled that the jury
could not consider the evidence for truth of the matter asserted, apparently conceding

that the district court admitted the recordings as substantive evidence.

(See

Respondent's Brief pp.15-17.) Had the State made such an assertion, the State would
be impliedly conceding that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
arguments

by

referring

to

the

recordings

as

substantive

evidence.

(See

Tr.Opening/Closing Arguments, p.98, L.19 - p.99, L.14. (State arguing "Those tapes
clearly indicate collusion."); see also State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507 (1999)
(finding misconduct where prosecutor argued an audio recording admitted solely for

1

If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be
reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Such review
includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading
the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant
persuades the appellate court that the complained of error satisfies this three-prong
inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and remand. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 229 (2010).
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impeachment

purposes was

substantive

evidence

of the

defendant's

guilt). 2)

Regardless, the record demonstrates that the recordings were admitted as substantive
evidence, over the objection of defense counsel, and the State's argument that the error
in this case is unpreserved is without merit.
When discussing the State's motion to present the audio recordings as rebuttal
evidence, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense counsel, Mr. Essma:] There's a huge objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: How is it improper rebuttal?
MR. ESSMA: How is it improper what?
THE COURT: Rebuttal.
MR. ESSMA: Because I'm not -- number one, they're hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, they're probably being offered to show they're directly
not true, rather than they are; right?
MR. ESSMA: I don't know what the state wants them in for, but they're
hearsay, number one, and I don't know what the exception to the hearsay
rule is going to be.
(Tr.2/16/11, p.1459, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added).)
hearsay objection

finding

that the evidence was

The Court overruled the

admissible for non-hearsay

impeachment purposes. (Tr. p.1469, Ls.5-9.) However, the district court later made it
clear that it viewed the recordings, not merely as impeaching or for some not-for-thetruth-of-the-matter-asserted-purpose, but as substantive evidence. The Court stated,
You're being allowed to make a record. I just -- Here's the thing. I'll
just be blunt: I've listened to them. I know what's on them. It's not a
mere prior inconsistent statement. It is direct evidence that because
of the late disclosure the state was not allowed to use in their case in
chief. And I noted at the time of that ruling that the danger of the late
disclosure is that there's a problem with witnesses getting up and saying
whatever they want.
In some cases this is an inconsistent statement with a
particular thing they said on the phone, but it goes beyond that. And
2

Counsel for Mr. Osterhoudt incorrectly cited to State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,
769 (1993), in support of this proposition in the Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief,
p.38, f.n.15.)
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it's obvious from the context of them it goes beyond that. So you have a
is offering it for more
right to object and to make a record, but the
than that, that's clear, and
listened
them.
I mean, how are they not just merely inconsistent statements? It's
witnesses discussing -- obviously there's some inferences that can be
drawn and perhaps argued one way or another -- but the clear gist of
much beyond mere prior inconsistent statement
(Tr. 2/16/11, p.1489, L.11 - p.1490, L.6 (emphasis added).)
The court further held that the audio recordings were admissible as "some of the
statements in these are prior inconsistent statements, or could be viewed that way," but
that,
What these tape-recorded conversations show is a pattern of
witnesses planning testimony, conferring about it. Concoct may be a
strong word, but that is an inference that can properly be drawn from the
recordings. Getting their stories together, at best.
Now there may be an alternate explanation for that, so the court in
making this ruling does not need to find that fact exactly if the evidence
has the tendency to show that, which is an obvious and reasonable
inference from the context of these calls.
So as to the relevance objection, some of the calls are brief, and
perhaps if that were the only fragment would not appear to have much
relevant information, but in light of the other phone calls they have obvious
and extensive relevance.
As to the question of impeachment, what we're dealing with here is
not merely impeachment of a prior inconsistent statement. We're talking
about bias, and I guess to put it uncharitably and maybe the most extreme
inference again, fabrication or concocting of testimony. The witnesses
testified to that. Their motive, their bias is all relevant. It is the most
important issue in the trial. It is the most important function of the justice
system, as the defense has argued when it came to the 404(b) evidence,
to get at the truth.

So bias is not collateral and bias is not something that is
limited necessarily by the impeachment rule of prior inconsistent
statements. And here by bias we have an effort where an inference can
be drawn strongly from these recordings that there was an effort to
coordinate testimony which was denied directly on the stand.
(Tr.2/17/11, p.1493, L.4 - p.1495, L.13. (emphasis added).)
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It is abundantly clear that the district court admitted these audio recordings for
the truth of the matter asserted. The record reflects that Mr. Osterhoudt objected on
hearsay grounds and the district court overruled his objection; therefore, his issue is
preserved for appeal. Should this Court find that the district court erred in allowing the
jury to consider these recordings as substantive evidence, the State bears the burden of
demonstrating this error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Once again, the State failed to make any assertion that, should this Court agree
with Mr. Osterhoudt and find that the district court did err in admitting the evidence, the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.)
As such, should this Court find that the district court erred in admitting the recorded
conversations between Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, and Mr. Osterhoudt and his
mother, this Court must vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court.
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is
followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013
Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending).

IV.
Even If Individually Harmless, The Accumulation Of Preserved Errors In This Case
Deprived Mr. Osterhoudt A Fair Trial, Requiring This Court To Vacate His Convictions
Finally, Mr. Osterhoudt asserts that under the doctrine of cumulative error, that
even if this Court finds the errors above to be individually cumulative, this Court should
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nevertheless vacate his conviction.

(Appellant's Brief, p.39.)

In response, the State

simply asserts that the district court did not error in the above rulings and that, therefore,
the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

(Respondent's Brief, p.17.)

Although

Mr. Osterhoudt does not withdraw his cumulative error argument, due to the fact that
the State has failed to claim that any error in any of the district court's rulings are
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, if this Court finds that the district court incorrectly
ruled on any of the preserved claims of error, this Court must vacate his conviction.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (holding that where alleged error is
followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Almaraz, 2013
Opinion No. 41 (Idaho, April 1, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Osterhoudt respectfully requests that this Court vacate all of his convictions
and remand his case to the district court.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2013.
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